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Policy Pollination: A Brief History of 
Social Protection’s Brief History in 
Africa 
Stephen Devereux 
December 2020 
Summary 
The relatively recent emergence and sustained rise of social protection as a 
policy agenda in Africa can be understood as either a nationally owned or ‘donor-
driven’ process. While elements of both can be seen in different countries at 
different times, this paper focuses on the pivotal role of transnational actors, 
specifically international development agencies, as ‘policy pollinators’ for social 
protection. These agencies deployed a range of tactics to induce African 
governments to implement cash transfer programmes and establish social 
protection systems, including: (1) building the empirical evidence base that cash 
transfers have positive impacts, for advocacy purposes; (2) financing social 
protection programmes until governments take over this responsibility;  
(3) strengthening state capacity to deliver social protection, through technical 
assistance and training workshops; (4) commissioning and co-authoring national 
social protection policies; (5) encouraging the domestication of international 
social protection law into national legislation. Despite these pressures and 
inducements, some governments have resisted or implemented social protection 
only partially and reluctantly, either because they are not convinced or because 
their political interests are not best served by allocating scarce resources to cash 
transfer programmes. This raises questions about the extent to which the 
agendas of development agencies are aligned or in conflict with national 
priorities, and whether social protection programmes and systems would flourish 
or wither if international support was withdrawn. 
Keywords 
Social protection, policy process, coercive diffusion, international development 
agencies, sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Executive Summary 
The emergence and rapid rise of social protection as a development policy 
agenda in Africa is well documented, but how this ‘success story’ happened is 
less well understood. This paper contributes to an emerging strand of literature 
that explores why social protection spread so rapidly throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa in the first two decades of this century. Four causal mechanisms for policy 
transfer between neighbouring or distant countries are discussed in the literature: 
learning, competition, emulation, and coercion. A fifth mechanism is identified in 
this paper, which is closely aligned to coercion. ‘Policy pollination’ involves 
international development agencies using their soft power of financial and 
technical assistance, to persuade aid-dependent governments to implement and 
scale up social protection, especially social cash transfer programmes, and to 
develop and institutionalise national social protection policies and systems. 
Policy pollination has been deployed as a tactic by development agencies for 
decades, from structural adjustment in the 1980s to Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers in the early 2000s to social protection since then. Three agencies are 
identified as the leading global ‘pollinators’ in the social protection policy transfer 
process – ILO, UNICEF, and the World Bank – and five mechanisms of policy 
pollination are then identified and discussed. 
First, development agencies invested heavily in building the evidence base 
that social protection programmes – starting with donor-funded pilot projects – 
contribute to positive outcomes such as food security and poverty reduction. This 
was done mainly for advocacy purposes: to demonstrate effectiveness of aid 
spending to their domestic constituencies, and to convince governments in Africa 
to take over the running and financing of national social protection programmes. 
Second, development agencies invested directly in financing social protection 
programmes in Africa, especially cash transfer pilot projects in low-income 
countries where governments were reluctant to dedicate substantial public 
resources to national programmes because of concerns about (un)affordability. 
This financial support was intended to be transitional: as national incomes rise 
and governments become convinced by social protection’s positive impacts they 
are expected to take over funding these programmes themselves – the ‘funding 
seesaw’. 
Third, development agencies have invested in capacity strengthening of 
African governments to design and implement programmes and build social 
protection systems. Mechanisms include training workshops, high-level 
dialogues, study tours, and embedding expatriate consultants in government 
ministries. The World Bank and ILO run their own training workshops, which 
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allows these agencies to disseminate their preferred social protection 
approaches to participants, who include influential policymakers and practitioners 
from low- and middle-income countries. 
Fourth, development agencies have initiated and supported processes of 
producing national social protection policies. In the year 2000, no country in 
Africa had a social protection policy or strategy. By 2010, this had risen to only 
five, but 30 countries promulgated a policy or strategy in the next nine years, 
mostly following donor-driven processes. In some cases, the logos of 
development agencies appear on the cover of these policy documents, 
alongside the national coat of arms. 
Fifth, development agencies such as ILO have promoted the domestication of 
international social protection law into national policies and laws, by 
advocating for rights-based approaches that are grounded in globally ratified 
documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the 
Recommendation on Social Protection Floors (2012). Although this is ‘soft law’ at 
international level, once written into national legislation or a country’s 
Constitution local civil society can hold their government accountable to deliver 
on the right to social protection. 
Despite this array of ‘policy pollination’ strategies used by international 
development agencies to induce African countries to adopt and scale up social 
protection, some governments have consistently resisted this pressure. This 
paper identifies two possible reasons for this resistance. One is that the 
constituencies prioritised by African governments (such as farmers and middle 
class citizens) do not coincide with vulnerable groups identified by development 
agencies as priorities for social protection (such as poor children and older 
persons). The second possibility is that there is genuine disagreement between 
African governments and their development partners about whether social 
protection – and specifically targeted cash transfers – is the most effective set of 
instruments for achieving national policy goals such as food security and poverty 
reduction. 
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1. Introduction 
Social protection is an indisputable success story of development policy and 
practice, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. At the global level, social protection 
was not mentioned at all in the Millennium Development Goals (United Nations 
2000), but just 15 years later it featured in three of the 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (United Nations 2015), with targets that are being monitored 
under Agenda 2030. At the continental level, not a single country in Africa had a 
national social protection policy in the year 2000, but almost two-thirds (35 out of 
55) had produced a policy or strategy by 2019. Although the coverage of social 
protection programmes remains relatively limited, millions of Africans who had no 
access 20 years ago now receive regular social assistance, typically in the form 
of monthly cash transfers (UNDP 2019). 
As social protection has established itself as an essential social policy sector, 
alongside and linked to education and health, so the literature surrounding it has 
evolved. Crudely, three phases can be identified. In the first decade of the 
century, much effort was invested in trying to establish whether social protection 
programmes are effective (do they work?), mainly through commissioned impact 
evaluations (this is discussed below as ‘building the evidence base’). By 2010, 
the balance of evidence was tilting heavily towards the positive: the case for 
social protection, even in the poorest countries, was effectively proven. Although 
impact evaluations continue, they now focus on testing design innovations and 
assessing progress towards programme objectives in particular contexts. 
Accordingly, the emphasis shifted towards institutionalising social protection – 
ensuring that governments have the necessary capacity to run programmes 
efficiently, that social protection was scaled-up from donor-driven projects to 
nationally owned programmes, and putting in place systems such as beneficiary 
databases and electronic payment mechanisms, all underpinned by a national 
social protection policy or strategy. The third phase dates from around 2015, 
when social protection appeared in the SDGs, and focuses on trying to 
understand how and why social protection spread so rapidly as a development 
policy discourse. This paper contributes to this third, evolving strand of literature. 
The burgeoning literature on social protection as a policy discourse connects 
with long-established theoretical and empirical literatures on social welfare in 
OECD countries (Esping-Andersen 1990; Schmitt and Starke 2012), on welfare 
provision in developing countries or the global South during and since the 
colonial period (Gough and Wood 2004; Midgley and Piachaud 2011; Schmitt 
2015) and on cross-country policy transfer processes (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; 
Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 2007; Obinger, Schmitt and Starke 2013). Most 
relevant for the purposes of this paper is an emerging empirical literature, 
grounded in political science, that analyses the diffusion of social protection 
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policies, specifically cash transfers, throughout the global South (von 
Gliszczynski and Leisering  2016; Leisering 2019), but often with a particular 
focus on sub-Saharan Africa (Adésínà 2011; Hickey et al. 2019). 
Policy transfer is often understood as a benign or neutral process, whereby 
‘knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements and ideas in one political 
system (past or present) is used in the development of policies’ administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system’ (Dolowitz and 
Marsh 2000: 5). Posited causal mechanisms for policy transfer include learning, 
competition between neighbouring countries, and emulation or constructivism – 
the tendency for diverse countries to mimic policies that have been socially 
constructed as desirable at the global level (such as free primary education or, in 
this context, social protection), even though adherence to these policies may be 
weak in practice. 
A fourth causal mechanism in the policy transfer literature is coercion, which 
involves the use of power (e.g. financial leverage) by transnational actors to 
induce policy change by national governments. For example,  
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank may 
shape policy in countries reliant on those entities for trade, foreign 
direct investment, aid, grants, loans… Coercion typically involves a 
change in incentives to nations, as when the World Bank conditions 
aid on fiscal austerity.  
(Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 2007: 454)  
Obinger, Schmitt and Starke (2013: 115) call this ‘coercive diffusion’: ‘An often 
mentioned case of coercive diffusion is financial aid linked to certain domestic 
reforms defined by donor countries and international institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund or the World Bank’. 
A soft form of ‘coercive diffusion’ is associated with the spread of hegemonic 
ideas through epistemic communities or policy entrepreneurs. ‘Powerful 
countries with the research infrastructure, the critical intellectual mass, and well-
developed connections between the policy world and various research nodes are 
unduly influential in the framing of policy discussions’ (Dobbin, Simmons and 
Garrett 2007: 456). 
This paper identifies a fifth mechanism – that I call ‘policy pollination’ – which is 
closely aligned to coercive diffusion and describes a particular process of policy 
transfer that, as argued below, underlies the rise of social protection in Africa. 
Cross-pollination in nature is the process by which pollen is carried from one 
flower to another by bees, birds, and other pollinators to fertilise the flower. For 
the purpose of this analogy, flowers are African countries, the pollen is social 
protection policies and pollinators are agents (staff, consultants) of international 
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development agencies, literally flying from country to country to propagate social 
protection. Fertilisation is achieved when countries adopt social protection 
policies and programmes as advised by their pollinators. Policy pollination 
carries elements of all four mechanisms identified in the policy transfer literature 
(learning, competition, emulation, and coercion), but in donor-dependent 
countries the dominant driver is hard or soft coercion. 
How have international development ‘pollinators’ spread the idea of social 
protection in Africa? How have they ensured that social protection programmes 
were implemented by African governments? How did they persuade 35 African 
governments to develop national social protection policies that are remarkably 
similar? This paper aims to provide answers to these questions, by defining the 
practice of ‘policy pollination’ and applying it to the diffusion of social protection 
across sub-Saharan Africa. 
The next section introduces the notion of policy pollination as a development 
tactic, drawing on Africa’s experience of structural adjustment in the 1980/90s, 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers in the early 2000s, and social protection 
since the early 2000s. Next, international development actors are identified as 
the leading pollinators in the social protection policy transfer process, dominated 
by three agencies: the ILO, UNICEF, and the World Bank. Five mechanisms of 
policy pollination are then discussed: (1) evidence-building; (2) financing;  
(3) capacity strengthening; (4) policy formulation; and (5) domestication of 
international law. Finally, I discuss why some African governments have resisted 
many years of pressure and inducements to adopt and scale up social protection 
in their country. 
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2. ‘Policy pollination’ as a 
development tactic 
International development agencies1 have intervened in social policy formulation 
in Africa since the colonial period and continue to do so today, decades after 
African countries achieved independence (Schmitt 2020). This has been 
achieved primarily through ‘coercive diffusion’, using the hard and soft power 
conferred by development finance – official development assistance (ODA), 
concessional lending and humanitarian relief – as leverage. In the 1980s, for 
instance, international financial institutions imposed conditions on structural 
adjustment loans that required African governments to, among other things, 
remove food price subsidies and impose user fees on poor citizens for health 
and education services. A striking feature of this set of ‘Washington consensus’ 
(Williamson 2000) policy prescriptions was their uniformity. A singular model for 
market liberalisation and state withdrawal, devised by a small but powerful group 
of development actors led by the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and 
IMF), was implemented by a large number of African governments, almost 
always against their will, with consequences for poor Africans that were 
ambivalent at best and lethal at worst (Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009).2 
In the early 2000s, a wave of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
spread across the global South, more than half being in Africa. In 2000 alone, 
25 African governments prepared a PRSP document (IMF 2016). Again, this 
policy process was driven by the Bretton Woods institutions. Preparing a PRSP 
with World Bank and IMF support was rewarded with concessional loans or debt 
relief (Ejolu 2008). Significantly, all PRSPs embodied the same set of poverty 
reduction pillars, framed within a neoliberal ideology: ‘good governance’, 
pro-poor economic growth, investment in human capital and, in some cases, 
social safety nets to protect the poorest. The striking similarities in these 
documents across diverse countries reveals the extent to which they were 
designed by external actors following a boilerplate template, rather than 
emerging organically from domestic deliberative processes about optimal 
strategies for reducing poverty in each country context. 
PRSPs were criticised as ‘a primary policy device of international development 
institutions [that] restrict practical and political options, while exacting heavy 
 
1  In this paper, ‘international development agencies’ refers to a wide range of transnational actors, including bilateral 
donors (e.g. DFID (now FCDO), GIZ, Irish Aid, USAID), multilateral agencies (e.g. European Union), United 
Nations organisations (e.g. ILO, UNICEF, WFP), international financial institutions (e.g. IMF, World Bank) and 
international NGOs (e.g. ActionAid, Concern Worldwide, Oxfam, Save the Children). 
2  The first PhD thesis I examined after I joined IDS in 1996 was by Chris Simms, who demonstrated that child 
mortality rates in Zambia were higher in districts where government clinics and hospitals introduced user fees, 
than in neighbouring districts where people had access to Christian mission health facilities, where no fees were 
charged (cf. Simms 2000). 
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establishment and compliance costs’ (Craig and Porter 2003: 53). Easterly 
(2006: 127) argued that ‘a PRSP is no substitute for democracy’ and asserted 
that many PRSPs were effectively shoring up anti-democratic regimes and 
dictatorships. Compliance was enforced via the coercive application of 
conditionalities on loans by the international actors that designed PRSPs. 
However, their roll-out to dozens of low- and middle-income countries was 
represented by the IMF and World Bank as participatory and democratic. The 
IMF described the adoption of PRSPs as a country-driven process, ‘promoting 
national ownership of strategies through broad-based participation of civil 
society’ (quoted by Ejolu 2008: 22). Although PRSPs were implemented in more 
than 35 African countries, in recent years they have almost disappeared, 
confirming how shallowly grounded they were in domestic policy processes.3 
As PRSPs faded into development policy history or were absorbed into the 
pillars of national growth and development strategies, so another wave of policy 
documents started spreading across Africa. Since 2010, 30 African countries 
have published a National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) or National Social 
Protection Strategy (NSPS) (Figure 2.1). These documents share many common 
features. Notably, they all include promises that the government will deliver 
social assistance to specified target groups: children, older persons, and other 
vulnerable groups as well as ‘the poor’ (UNDP 2019: 56). As discussed later, 
these policy statements have been heavily influenced – financed, commissioned 
and/or (co-)authored – by international development agencies. 
As Figure 2.1 reveals, the number of African countries with a NSPP or NSPS 
multiplied from just five in 2010 to 35 in 2019. It is difficult to believe that this is a 
coincidence – that more than half the governments in Africa spontaneously and 
independently decided to introduce a social protection policy or strategy within a 
few years. So how did this happen? Are NSPPs the new PRSPs? Can social 
protection be modelled as a new wave of ‘policy pollination’, led by development 
agencies using the leverage of development finance and imposed on – rather 
than chosen by – African governments? 
 
 
3  The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) page on the IMF website was ‘Last updated: Wednesday, 
December 28, 2016’ (accessed 23 January 2020). 
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Figure 2.1 New national social protection policies 
or strategies in Africa by year, 2000–2019 
Source: Author’s own. 
 
A revealing statement by two United Nations Special Rapporteurs highlights both 
the disproportionate power that international institutions exercise over social 
policy formulation in poor countries, and the contradictions between the harsh 
Washington consensus policies that were imposed in the 1980s (e.g. making 
poor people pay for education and health care) and the expansionist social 
protection policies (notably giving free cash to poor people) that were advocated 
by the same institutions in the 2000s. 
In the past, major international institutions have pushed States to 
lower government spending and programming in favour of economic 
development, opening markets and reducing the size of the State. In 
the last decade however, many international institutions have begun 
to address the benefits of social protection systems to development 
and to promote their adoption.  
(de Schutter and Sepúlveda 2012: 3) 
As with PRSPs, the story of social protection’s rapid rise in Africa is interpreted 
differently by different observers, some seeing it as a success for African 
governments, others as a triumph for international development actors. This can 
perhaps be represented as two stylised narratives. 
 
 
ids.ac.uk IDS Working Paper Volume 2020 Number 543 
CSP Working Paper 018 
Policy Pollination: A Brief History of Social Protection’s Brief History in Africa 
17 
 
 
 
1. The ‘national ownership’ narrative: Social protection in Africa is a 
success story for African social policy in the early twenty-first century. 
Almost two in three African countries now have a national social protection 
policy or strategy, from a baseline of zero in 2000. Large-scale nationally 
administered social protection programmes have been introduced and rolled 
out to millions of people, notably the Child Support Grant in South Africa 
(launched in 1998, reaches 12 million children), Productive Safety Net 
Programme in Ethiopia (launched in 2005, reaches 9 million people), Vision 
2020 Umurenge Programme in Rwanda (launched in 2008, reaches 150,000 
households), Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty in Ghana (launched 
in 2008, reaches 150,000 people), among many others (UNDP 2019). 
Several governments in Africa now have social protection ministries, 
agencies, and laws. 
2. The ‘donor-driven’ narrative: Social protection in Africa is a success 
story for the international development community in the early twenty-
first century. The development industry (United Nations agencies, bilateral 
and multilateral donors, international financial institutions, international NGOs, 
development consultants, management consortia, research institutes) has 
vigorously ‘pollinated’ social protection throughout Africa. National policies do 
not necessarily imply national ownership. Government commitment to social 
protection is variable across the continent, being generally lower in the 
poorest aid-dependent countries, where national social protection strategies 
are conceived and often drafted by international consultants and most social 
protection programmes have been designed, financed and evaluated by 
development agencies and their agents. 
Support for both these positions can be found in the social protection literature. 
In 2010, an influential book titled Just Give Money to the Poor presented social 
cash transfers in its sub-title as The Development Revolution from the Global 
South (Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme 2010; emphasis added), implying that the 
idea is indigenous rather than imported. By contrast, an article published in the 
Journal of Social Policy in 2016 was subtitled How International Organizations 
Defined the Field of Social Cash Transfers in the 2000s (von Gliszczynski and 
Leisering 2016). 
Does it matter which of the above (simplified) narratives is a closer 
approximation to the truth? Perhaps both are true, and social protection is a 
success story for governments, international agencies, and the African poor: a 
‘win–win–win’. Surely what matters is that poor people receive assistance that 
alleviates their poverty, protects them against risks and shocks, reduces their 
food insecurity and facilitates their access to essential services like education 
and health care? This is the ‘bottom line’, but it also matters which narrative is 
true, because if the second narrative is closer to reality than the first then 
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questions of domestic commitment and sustainability become crucial. What 
would happen if the donors withdraw, or shift their focus and spending to another 
policy agenda? How much of their heavy investments in building social 
protection capacity in countries across Africa would remain? 
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3. International development 
agencies as ‘policy pollinators’ 
Social protection as a development policy discourse emerged out of social safety 
nets, a limited set of instruments that straddled the gap, rather uneasily, between 
social assistance and humanitarian relief. The 1990 World Development Report 
set out a two-pronged strategy for reducing poverty: labour-intensive economic 
growth, and provision of basic social services to the poor. The report also 
identified the need for safety net programmes, as a complementary third 
element. 
Even if this basic two-part strategy is adopted, many of the world’s 
poor – the sick, the old, those who live in resource-poor regions, and 
others will continue to experience severe deprivation. Many others 
will suffer temporary setbacks owing to seasonal variations in 
income, loss of the family breadwinner, famine, or adverse 
macroeconomic shocks. A comprehensive approach to poverty 
reduction, therefore, calls for a program of well-targeted transfers 
and safety nets as an essential complement to the basic strategy. 
(World Bank 1990: 3; emphasis added) 
This is possibly the first articulation in the development policy discourse of what 
later became the two building blocks of social protection systems in the global 
South: targeted transfers or social assistance to the chronically poor (who 
‘experience severe deprivation’) and categorical vulnerable groups (‘the sick, the 
old’), as well as safety nets or social insurance for those experiencing livelihood 
shocks (‘temporary setbacks’).4 In the late 1990s, the World Bank developed the 
safety nets component into its ‘Social Risk Management’ framework (World Bank 
2001), and it continues to use the term ‘safety nets’ even though it is out of 
favour with other agencies. As recently as 2018, the World Bank published the 
third edition of The State of Social Safety Nets (World Bank 2018). 
In 2000, social protection effectively did not yet exist in the development policy 
discourse. The period since has been framed by two global position statements 
about development policy: the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). With hindsight, it seems incredible that 
the MDGs did not contain a single mention of social protection. Just 15 years 
later, social protection consolidated its entrenchment in the international 
development policy discourse by being explicitly named in three of the 17 SDGs, 
 
4  In the global social policy discourse, these building blocks have their origins in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (United Nations 1948) and the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention (ILO 1952). 
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as a mechanism for ending poverty (Goal 1), enhancing gender equality and 
empowerment (Goal 5) and reducing inequality (Goal 10).5 
2012 was another watershed year for social protection. Three international 
development agencies – the ILO, UNICEF, and World Bank – had emerged as 
the leading actors in this sector in the global South. It was increasingly clear that 
social protection was here to stay; it was not a development policy experiment or 
fad that would disappear after a few years. Coincidentally, these agencies each 
released definitive statements of their approach to social protection in the same 
year. 
In June 2012, the International Labour Conference endorsed a Recommendation 
Concerning National Floors of Social Protection, which presented an explicit 
rights-based approach to social protection, building on the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948. The Recommendation defined social protection floors 
as ‘nationally defined sets of basic social security guarantees which secure 
protection aimed at preventing or alleviating poverty, vulnerability and social 
exclusion’ (ILO 2012). ‘The guarantees should ensure at a minimum that, over 
the life cycle, all in need have access to essential health care and to basic 
income security’ (ILO 2012). The four guarantees are: 
1. Basic income security for children; 
2. Basic income security for persons in active age unable to earn sufficient 
income; 
3. Basic income security for persons in old age; 
4. Access to a set of goods and services constituting essential health care 
including maternity care. 
In effect, this set of provisions elaborates and gives rights-based effect to the 
underdeveloped social assistance component of social protection systems, since 
the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 60 years earlier had 
focused mainly on social insurance. 
Also released in 2012, UNICEF’s Social Protection Strategic Framework 
(UNICEF 2012) identified three principles for ‘integrated social protection 
systems’: progressive realisation of universal coverage; nationally owned 
systems and national leadership; and inclusive social protection – tackling social 
exclusion. The specific focus of UNICEF’s engagement with social protection is 
 
5  Goal 1, Target 3 – End poverty: Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, 
including [social protection] floors. 
Goal 5, Target 4 – Gender equality and empowerment: Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work 
through the provision of public services and social protection policies. 
Goal 10, Target 4 – Reduce inequality: Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and 
progressively achieve greater equality (United Nations 2015). 
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revealed in the subtitle: Enhancing Equity for Children. While this naturally 
reflects UNICEF’s mandate as the United Nations agency for children, it also 
leads UNICEF to favour a certain set of policy instruments and to prioritise some 
vulnerable or ‘at risk’ groups above others. 
UNICEF’s vision of a social protection system has four components (UNICEF 
2012): 
1. Social transfers: Predictable direct transfers to individuals or households, 
both in-kind and in cash, to protect against shocks and support accumulation 
of human, financial and productive assets. 
2. Ensuring access to services: Interventions that reduce economic and 
social barriers to basic social services. 
3. Social support and care services: Human resource-intensive services that 
identify and reduce vulnerability and exclusion. 
4. Legislation and policy reform: Changing policies and legislation to remove 
inequalities in access to services and/or economic opportunities, addressing 
issues of discrimination and exclusion. 
Significantly, the World Bank’s Social Protection and Labor Strategy (World Bank 
2012) links social protection directly to labour markets: ‘social protection and 
labor systems... help people and families find jobs, improve their productivity, 
cope with shocks, and invest in the health, education, and well-being of their 
children’. The subtitle – Resilience, Equity, and Opportunity – highlights that the 
World Bank sees social protection as performing instrumental functions, beyond 
being a right or entitlement. It should contribute to building resilience and 
generate opportunities to escape from poverty, such that beneficiaries will 
become self-reliant and resilient and ultimately no longer need social assistance. 
The World Bank strategy has three overarching goals: 
1. ‘Improve resilience by helping people insure against drops in well-being from 
different types of shocks’. 
2. ‘Improve equity by reducing poverty and destitution and promoting equality of 
opportunity’. 
3. ‘Promote opportunity by building human capital, assets, and access to jobs 
and by freeing families to make productive investments because of their 
greater sense of security’. 
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The strategy envisages a linear progression to building social protection and 
labour systems, starting with a few uncoordinated projects towards fully 
connected, well-functioning and efficiently run programmes. ‘The strategic 
direction is to help developing countries move from fragmented approaches to 
more harmonized systems for social protection and labor’. With this framing, the 
main prongs of the World Bank’s strategy are social assistance, social insurance, 
and active labour market programmes (Robalino et al. 2012): 
1. Social assistance: cash transfers; food programs; public works. 
2. Social insurance: unemployment benefits; health insurance; disability 
pensions; survivors’ pensions; old-age pensions. 
3. Active labour market programmes: intermediation; counselling; job search 
and matching; vocational skills training; wage subsidies to firms. 
While social assistance programmes in particular have proliferated throughout 
Africa (UNDP 2019), many with World Bank financial and technical support, 
social insurance has received less attention and active labour market 
programmes have disappointed. A recent review of evaluations concluded that 
‘active labor market policies are much less effective than policymakers typically 
assume. Many of these evaluations find no significant impacts on either 
employment or earnings’ (McKenzie 2017). 
These position statements by three of the most influential international 
development agencies are important because they define the focus and 
parameters of each agency’s engagement with, and support for, social protection 
policies and programmes in the countries where they operate – where they 
exercise substantial influence over policymaking processes, using mechanisms 
that are discussed next. 
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4. ‘Policy pollination’ mechanisms 
The international development community (not only the ILO, UNICEF, and World 
Bank, also DFID, FAO, GIZ, UNDP, WFP and many others) have invested 
heavily in promoting social protection in Africa since 2000, using various 
mechanisms. Five are discussed here: (1) building the evidence base for social 
protection impacts; (2) financing social protection programmes and systems;  
(3) strengthening government technical and operational capacity; (4) instigating 
national social protection policies; and (5) domesticating international law. 
4.1 Building the evidence base 
In the early 2000s the international development community settled on ‘social 
cash transfers’ (SCTs) as their preferred modality for social protection in low- 
and middle-income countries. The UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) set out the theoretical case for delivering cash transfers to 
poor people. 
While poverty is multi-dimensional, low and variable income is 
central to the problem. Modest but regular income from cash 
transfers helps households to smooth consumption and sustain 
spending on food, schooling and health care… Over time, transfer 
income can help households to build human capital [and] save up to 
buy productive assets… Cash transfers can thus both protect living 
standards (alleviating destitution) and promote wealth creation. 
(DFID 2011: i) 
However, the evidence base at first was thin. There were few regular social cash 
transfer programmes in low-income countries, and even fewer that had been 
rigorously evaluated. There was a growing body of credible evidence from Latin 
America about the positive impacts of conditional cash transfer programmes 
(Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Adato and Hoddinott 2010), but very little evidence 
from sub-Saharan Africa about unconditional cash transfers. A large part of the 
initial effort by development partners to persuade governments in Africa to 
introduce or expand social protection was investment in building the evidence 
base that unconditional cash transfers can in fact protect and promote living 
standards. The implicit theory of change is that policy adoption is an evidence-
driven process. Proving that social protection can contribute to desired outcomes 
such as poverty reduction would convince African governments to implement 
and pay for their own national social protection programmes. 
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From the very first cash transfer pilot projects in Africa, therefore, development 
agencies allocated funds to monitoring and evaluation (M&E), especially of 
projects that they instigated and financed. The technical justification for 
conducting impact evaluations is to confirm that a policy intervention is achieving 
its objectives, and to generate learning for improved design or delivery, to 
enhance impacts and cost-effectiveness. However, development agencies also 
commission evaluations of interventions they support for advocacy reasons, 
aimed at two distinct audiences. 
First, international agencies need to justify their spending on development 
programmes to their domestic constituencies back home. Demonstrating ‘value 
for money’ and showing positive impacts – in terms of, say, reductions in poverty 
or child malnutrition – is strategically necessary to keep the pipeline of 
development assistance flowing. Cash transfer projects are self-contained 
interventions with immediate and easily demonstrable benefits, which allows 
agencies to claim impacts such as lifting thousands of poor Africans out of 
poverty, as their direct and attributable achievement. More broadly, pilot projects 
offer opportunities for donor agencies to stamp their logo on reports that quantify 
their contribution to a range of desirable development outcomes in low- and 
middle-income countries. Such evidence of success leverages further rounds of 
funding from development agencies, which is underwritten by taxpayers in high-
income countries. The ongoing surge in externally supported social assistance 
programmes in Africa suggests that the evidence is persuasive, at least to the 
international development community. 
Second, as noted, international agencies commission impact evaluations of 
‘their’ projects for advocacy purposes in countries where they work, as an 
integral part of the ‘policy pollination’ strategy. Specifically, findings of positive 
impacts of SCTs were intended to convince African governments to adopt and 
scale up poverty-targeted cash transfer programmes. For this reason, even 
small-scale pilot projects received disproportionately large evaluation budgets, 
from which generalisations were extrapolated about SCTs as a modality for 
delivering social protection in Africa. Pilot projects were actually preferred to 
national programmes for the first generation of evaluations, for several reasons: 
1. Control groups could easily be drawn from equally poor and technically 
eligible people within the same community or in neighbouring communities. 
Ethical concerns about preferential treatment for beneficiaries and exclusion 
of equally needy control group households were countered with the ‘roll-out’ 
argument: this year’s control group could become next year’s beneficiaries. 
2. Pilot projects are small enough that representative samples can be drawn to 
demonstrate statistically significant impacts. The fact that pilot projects by 
definition create massive exclusion by design (or under-coverage) was 
justified as transitional – once governments see the evidence that the 
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programme works they will choose to support it, finance it and expand 
coverage to all eligible individuals or households at the country level. 
3. Pilot projects allow experimentation to test different design and 
implementation modalities. In Lesotho’s Cash and Food Transfers Pilot 
Project, some beneficiaries received food packages, some received cash 
transfers, and some received both cash and food. In Kenya’s Hunger Safety 
Net Programme, three discrete targeting mechanisms determined eligibility in 
different communities: households with high dependency ratios, community-
based wealth ranking, or older persons (Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2015). 
4. Pilot projects have fixed budgets and predetermined exit strategies, whereas 
most national social protection programmes are more expensive by an order 
of magnitude and are implemented on a long-term or permanent basis – 
longer than donors can commit to, given their 1–5 year project cycles. 
The UK development agency explicitly acknowledged the link between building 
the evidence base and building political support for cash transfer programmes. 
‘Robust monitoring and evaluation are crucial both for programme performance 
and political sustainability. The rapid spread of cash transfers in MICs in recent 
years has been in large part due to just such high-quality analysis and M&E’ 
(DFID 2011: vii). 
The first decade of this century saw a rapid accumulation of evidence that social 
protection in Africa, specifically cash transfers, ‘works’. However, first generation 
evaluations were not always rigorous. A GTZ-funded evaluation of the influential 
Pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme in Kalomo District, Zambia found 
improvements for beneficiary households in several indicators relative to 
baseline, including food security, livelihoods, and asset ownership (MCDSS and 
GTZ 2007). However, this study and others were rightly criticised for not 
including a control group, which meant that findings of positive changes in 
beneficiaries’ wellbeing could not be unambiguously attributed to the SCT 
scheme. 
There were also other problems. First, any intervention that gives cash to poor 
households makes them better off by definition, so counting household assets 
and consumption before and after they receive project benefits is measuring 
short-term programme effects, not sustainable programme impacts. It was far 
from clear that gains recorded would be sustained after the project ended, which 
exposed these ‘baseline to endline’ evaluations to accusations of inflated claims 
about their long-term impacts on indicators such as poverty and asset 
ownership. Second, coverage of these first generation SCT projects was tiny – 
the Kalomo SCT pilot reached only 1,027 households when it was evaluated in 
2007 – and it is easier to get impressive results working with a thousand 
beneficiaries than with millions. Related to this, positive outcomes were 
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reinforced by the intensive support and attention provided by NGO workers 
operating at community level, but scaling up these projects and transferring them 
to national governments requires entirely different management models and 
financing modalities, and raises more complex sets of challenges. 
Early attempts were made to synthesise the accumulating experience and 
evidence with various forms of social protection programmes across African 
countries. In 2005, UNICEF commissioned Save the Children UK, HelpAge 
International and the Institute of Development Studies to compile ‘lessons from 
cash transfer schemes in east and southern Africa for supporting the most 
vulnerable children and households’ (Devereux et al. 2005). In 2007, DFID 
commissioned a Review of Evidence and Evidence Gaps on the Effectiveness 
and Impacts of DFID-Supported Pilot Social Transfer Schemes (Devereux and 
Coll-Black 2007). In 2009, a book was published titled Social Protection in Africa 
(Ellis, Devereux and White 2009) that presented 15 case study programmes 
from six countries, drawing on research commissioned by the Regional Hunger 
and Vulnerability Programme (RHVP). RHVP was a donor initiative, funded by 
two bilateral agencies – the UK’s DFID and the Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID) – that explicitly linked evidence-building to 
policy advocacy (see Box 4.1). 
Following these first generation social protection initiatives, a more sophisticated 
wave of impact evaluations was commissioned of larger projects and programmes 
such as the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia, the Hunger 
Safety Net Programme (HSNP) in Kenya, and Concern Worldwide’s ‘Graduation 
model’ projects in Burundi and Rwanda. Multi-year multi-round household 
surveys were designed (baseline, midline, endline, sometimes also a follow-up) 
with treatment and control groups, following rigorous quasi-experimental 
randomised control trial (RCT) protocols. 
In 2011, DFID published an Evidence Paper on cash transfers in developing 
countries. Key findings synthesised from available evidence at the time included 
the following (DFID 2011: ii–iii): 
‒ ‘Cash transfers can reduce inequality and the depth or severity of poverty’. 
‒ ‘Cash transfers might support “graduation” from poverty for those of working 
age’. 
‒ ‘Cash transfers have leveraged sizeable gains in access to health and 
education services’. 
‒ ‘Cash transfers help to strengthen household productivity and capacity for 
income generation’. 
‒ ‘The introduction of cash transfers into poor, remote areas can stimulate 
demand and local market development’. 
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‒ ‘Transfers are likely to contribute to long-term growth by raising the human 
capital of the next generation’. 
‒ ‘Transfers can influence gender relations and empower the poor’. 
Box 4.1 Regional Hunger and Vulnerability 
Programme 
From 2005 to 2011, RHVP worked in six countries of southern Africa 
(Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), 
compiling evidence of successful social protection initiatives and 
disseminating these lessons across the six countries to promote uptake of 
‘best practice’. 
RHVP activities reflected a simple ‘policy influencing’ model: ‘Evidence-
building + Capacity-building = Positive policy change’. In other words, 
providing evidence that social protection works plus building government 
capacity – through technical assistance, study tours, training courses, policy 
workshops, etc. – should lead to adoption of social protection by national 
governments. Under its Regional Evidence-Building Agenda (REBA), RHVP 
commissioned international and national researchers to analyse social 
protection programmes in each country. These were compiled and published 
in a book called Social Protection in Africa, with thematic chapters (targeting, 
delivery, coverage, cost-effectiveness, etc.) and 15 case study chapters. 
An intriguing feature of the 15 case studies is their diversity. Apart from five 
cash transfer programmes, including a social pension and a ‘food subsidy’ 
delivered in the form of cash, the case studies included a public works 
project, a school feeding scheme, agricultural input subsidies, education 
material fairs, ‘neighbourhood care points’ and ‘chief’s fields’ for vulnerable 
children, and small livestock transfers. 
Although public works and school feeding remain on the social protection 
agenda, development agencies dislike and discourage subsidies, while 
indigenous ideas like neighbourhood care points and chief’s fields have 
disappeared. Since Social Protection in Africa was published, the 
international discourse on social protection in Africa has converged around 
social cash transfers, to the neglect and marginalisation of most other 
instruments. 
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Five years later, DFID commissioned a ‘rigorous review’ of cash transfer impacts 
from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). By 2016, the evidence base had 
grown substantially. The ODI review reinforced and added nuance to theoretical 
predictions and earlier findings. Summarising the impacts reported in 165 
evaluations of 56 cash transfer programmes in low- and middle-income 
countries, Bastagli et al. (2016) found ‘strong evidence’ that cash transfers are 
associated with increases in: 
‒ Total household expenditure (a proxy for reductions in monetary poverty); 
‒ Food expenditure and dietary diversity (indicators of food security); 
‒ School attendance (but not necessarily improved learning outcomes); 
‒ Use of health services; 
‒ Investment in livestock; 
‒ Household savings; 
‒ Women’s decision-making power. 
In cases where cash transfers did not significantly reduce monetary poverty, 
Bastagli et al. speculate that this was probably because transfer amounts were 
inadequate or the programme duration was too short. In cases where education 
and health outcomes did not improve, Bastagli et al. point to the need to invest 
in quality of services – cash transfers can only stimulate demand for these 
services. 
Very few evaluations in the ODI review found significant positive impacts on 
children’s malnutrition (i.e. anthropometric indicators such as stunting and 
underweight), probably because the determinants of nutrition status are multiple 
and cash transfers impact mainly on food intake, not necessarily on other 
determinants such as diet quality, childcare practices (e.g. breastfeeding), water 
quality and access to sanitation facilities. 
Almost all the evidence assembled in these books and reports derives from 
evaluations that focus narrowly on changes in the material wellbeing of 
beneficiaries over a short period of time, bounded by and limited to their 
participation in one social protection programme. Very few of these studies 
consider the social and psychosocial impacts of these programmes, and almost 
none situates the intervention in its broader socio-political context, not even by 
considering the confounding effects of synergies or conflicts between the 
intervention and existing government programmes. These decontextualising and 
time-bound parameters allow the positive impacts of these programmes to be 
exaggerated and potential negative side-effects (such as stigma and social 
exclusion) to be overlooked. 
 
ids.ac.uk IDS Working Paper Volume 2020 Number 543 
CSP Working Paper 018 
Policy Pollination: A Brief History of Social Protection’s Brief History in Africa 
29 
 
 
 
Empirical evidence that giving money to poor people in Africa leaves them better 
off than before has been presented in hundreds of research reports and journal 
articles, and synthesised in several overview publications since 2010, including: 
1. Cash Transfers Evidence Paper. Written by staff in the Policy Division of 
DFID. ‘This paper provides a synthesis of current global evidence on the 
impact of cash transfers in developing countries, and of what works in 
different contexts… While the primary purpose of cash transfers is to reduce 
poverty and vulnerability, the evidence shows that they have proven potential 
to contribute directly or indirectly to a wider range of development outcomes’ 
(DFID 2011: i). 
2. The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in sub-Saharan 
Africa. A book written by a World Bank economist and a World Bank 
consultant. ‘In 2009, growing interest in the use of CT programs in sub-
Saharan Africa led the World Bank to initiate a comprehensive desk review of 
the CT programs that had been used recently in the region. This book 
presents the results of the review’ (Garcia and Moore 2012: 2). 
3. Social Protection for Africa’s Children. An edited book published with 
financial support from DFID and UNICEF. ‘This book includes both 
“quantitative” and “qualitative” studies of social protection in Africa that either 
target children directly or have significant impacts on children’s well-being’ 
(Handa, Devereux and Webb 2011: 7). 
4. Cash Transfers: What Does the Evidence Say? A rigorous review 
commissioned by UK Aid from the Overseas Development Institute. ‘This 
review retrieves, assesses and synthesises the evidence on the effects of 
cash transfers on individuals and households through a rigorous review of the 
literature of 15 years, from 2000 to 2015’ (Bastagli et al. 2016: 5). 
5. From Evidence to Action: The Story of Cash Transfers and Impact 
Evaluation in sub-Saharan Africa. An edited book that was a product of the 
Transfer Project, co-funded by FAO and UNICEF. ‘Evidence on the 
effectiveness of unconditional cash transfers provided through government 
programmes in SSA has not been substantially documented… One key 
objective of this book is to provide an overview of this accumulated evidence’ 
(Davis et al. 2016: 1). 
6. Realizing the Full Potential of Social Safety Nets in Africa. A World Bank 
report in its Africa Development Forum series. ‘This report first presents a 
snapshot of social safety nets in Africa and the mounting evidence for the 
effectiveness of these programs in promoting the well-being and productive 
inclusion of the poorest and most vulnerable’ (Beegle et al. 2018: 2). 
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7. The State of Social Assistance in Africa. A report produced by UNDP in 
collaboration with other UN agencies and the African Union. ‘The motivation 
behind this report and data platform has been to provide African 
policymakers, civil servants, researchers, development practitioners and civil 
society a comprehensive overview of social assistance in Africa across its 
legal, financing and institutional dimensions’ (UNDP 2019: 11). 
None of these publications is a product of ‘blue skies’ academic research; they 
were written or commissioned by international development agencies for 
advocacy purposes, to promote specific policy positions. The Foreword to From 
Evidence to Action states: ‘These pages also document the ways in which the 
Transfer Project has influenced the policy debate in each of the eight countries’ 
(Davis et al. 2016: vi). While the primary intended impact of cash transfer 
projects is to improve the wellbeing of beneficiaries, the primary intended impact 
of cash transfer evaluations is to convince governments to implement and 
finance national cash transfer programmes. 
Interestingly, the claims for positive impacts of social protection in Africa draw 
from a very narrow evidence base – about a dozen mostly anglophone former 
British colonies in East and Southern Africa, plus the anglophone former British 
colony of Ghana in West Africa. The book Social Protection in Africa (Ellis, 
Devereux and White 2009) has case studies from only six countries.6 Social 
Protection for Africa’s Children (Handa, Devereux and Webb 2011) presents 
evidence from seven countries.7 From Evidence to Action: The Story of Cash 
Transfers and Impact Evaluation in sub-Saharan Africa (Davis et al. 2016) has 
eight country case studies.8 This is not just a small selection (11 out of Africa’s 
55 countries), it is also heavily overlapping: eight of the 11 countries are 
represented in at least two of these books, while Malawi and Zambia feature in 
all three. 
A high proportion of SCT programmes in Africa have now been rigorously 
evaluated, some several times, often applying RCT principles (difference-in-
differences between control and treatment groups from baseline to endline). 
Most or all of these evaluations have been commissioned and paid for by 
international agencies, rather than the governments of the countries where these 
programmes are implemented, and they have been conducted by research 
institutes and consultancy firms from Europe and North America. Very rarely are 
evaluations led by African researchers or consultants, though African partners 
are usually subcontracted to perform functions such as data collection. The most 
evaluated programme in Africa is Ethiopia’s PSNP, which implemented a mixed 
methods longitudinal evaluation over a 14-year period from 2006 to 2018, with 
 
6  Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
7  Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia. 
8  Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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about 3,000 participants plus control households re-interviewed every two years. 
The survey was administered by the Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency, and 
the World Bank commissioned the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) and IDS to conduct these evaluations, with in-country support from 
Dadimos Development Consultants (Sabates-Wheeler et al. forthcoming). 
Conversely, most government-owned social protection programmes in Africa are 
weakly monitored and almost never evaluated, either by governments or by 
development agencies. Why is this the case? Possibly because national 
governments and their international development partners have different 
agendas in supporting social protection. African governments have little incentive 
to undertake evaluations of their own programmes. They might argue that if 
social protection is their mandate as part of an implicit ‘social contract’ between 
citizens and the state, then delivering social assistance and social insurance is 
all that matters – there is no need to quantify the positive impacts of these 
programmes on poverty or any other outcomes. On the other hand, development 
agencies have no incentive to evaluate government programmes because they 
(the agencies) cannot claim the credit for positive impacts. For these reasons, 
government programmes tend to be under-evaluated while donor-funded 
projects tend, if anything, to be over-evaluated. This asymmetry confirms that 
building the evidence base for donor-supported social protection in Africa is 
primarily an advocacy agenda. 
4.2 Financing social protection programmes 
Many countries in Africa were initially reluctant to introduce social protection 
programmes, for two main reasons: ‘dependency syndrome’ and unaffordability. 
First, governments feared that giving money to poor people would undermine 
their community-based informal support systems and create dependence on 
‘handouts’ from the state. Empirical evidence for these concerns is lacking, not 
least because the cash transfers delivered in African countries are too small to 
disincentive recipients from working to earn an income (Shepherd et al. 2011). 
Nonetheless, this perception persists, sometimes reinforced by pejorative beliefs 
about the poor (e.g. that they would ‘drink the money’). This partly explains the 
resistance of some African governments to introduce unconditional cash 
transfers (as discussed later), despite consistent pressure and financial 
incentives from international agencies. 
Second, African governments often see social protection as unaffordable, given 
fiscal constraints and competing priorities for public spending (Seekings 2017). 
In particular, cash transfers at scale are regarded as too expensive, especially if 
they involve regular transfers of meaningful amounts of cash to all people 
defined as poor in the country every month, not only for a year or two but 
indefinitely. 
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One response to the reality of limited budgets and low prioritisation of social 
protection in much of Africa was for external actors to provide the seed funding 
themselves, especially for technical inputs such as design and systems-building, 
but also, in cases of small-scale pilot projects, for cash transfers. However, this 
was intended to be an interim measure until governments assume responsibility 
for running and financing these projects as national programmes. The 
anticipated shift in financing from external to national sources can be illustrated 
as a ‘funding seesaw’. Figure 4.1 has been turned sideways to illustrate this 
effect across countries rather than in a single country over time, with dark bars 
representing the proportion of social assistance spending that is ‘donor-funded’ 
and light bars showing the proportion that is government-funded. All social 
assistance spending (100 per cent) in the seven countries on the left (including 
Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan) is donor-funded and all social assistance 
spending in the six countries on the right (including Botswana, Namibia, and 
Mauritius) is domestically funded. In countries falling between these two 
extremes (from Guinea-Bissau to Senegal) the balance between external and 
domestic financing varies from 90:10 to 10:90. 
Figure 4.1 Share of donor and government funding 
of social assistance in sub-Saharan Africa 
Source: © World Bank (2018: 18), CC BY 3.0 IGO. 
It is striking that the countries where social protection is fully funded by external 
actors are some of the world’s poorest and most aid-dependent economies. 
Conversely, all the countries where social protection is fully funded out of 
domestic resources are middle- or high-income economies.9 This provides 
empirical evidence for a familiar dilemma – that countries with the greatest need 
 
9  World Bank country and lending groups (accessed 24 July 2020) 
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for social protection have the least resources to deliver it – and offers a 
justification for external actors stepping in to fill the financing gap. One 
characteristic of low-income economies is a small proportion of people who are 
formally employed and paying income tax that government can collect and 
allocate to social protection. Sub-Saharan Africa has ‘the smallest proportion of 
working-age population in the world’ (ILO 2017: 130) and high levels of economic 
informality, therefore a very small tax base. The ‘funding seesaw’ predicts that as 
national incomes rise, governments will take on increasing responsibility for 
financing their social protection programmes, which also allows them to take 
more control over social protection design and delivery. Until then, development 
agencies will continue to offer full or partial funding of social protection in low-
income African countries, and they will continue to exploit this leverage by 
shaping social protection in these countries to reflect their own mandates and 
objectives. 
A second response by external actors to claims that social protection is 
unaffordable in poor countries was to downplay moral or rights-based arguments 
and present an economic argument instead: the ‘business case’ for ‘investment’ 
in social protection. This required demonstrating that public spending on social 
protection generates economic returns to individual beneficiaries, local 
economies, and the national economy. Pathways from social transfers to 
economic growth include human capital formation (this explains why the World 
Bank promotes conditional cash transfers that require beneficiaries to send their 
children to school and health clinics) and local income multipliers (because cash 
transfers stimulate demand for goods and services). FAO applied a methodology 
called LEWIE (Local Economy Wide Impact Evaluation) to simulate the multiplier 
effects of cash transfer programmes (Thome et al. 2016). The Economic Policy 
Research Unit (EPRI) used a microsimulation model showing how investment in 
social protection contributes to economic growth, reducing poverty and requiring 
less social protection in the future (Samson 2005). The UK and Australian aid 
agencies each commissioned reviews of the effects of social protection on 
economic growth (Barrientos and Scott 2008; Mathers and Slater 2014; 
respectively). While these initiatives might be characterised as contributions to 
the evidence-building agenda rather than the financing debate, its primary 
purpose was advocacy – challenging the perception that social protection is 
wasteful or unproductive expenditure that low-income countries cannot afford. 
Related to this ‘social protection as an investment’ argument was work 
demonstrating that social protection can generate ‘value for money’ (VfM) for 
governments as well as agencies, where VfM is analysed in terms of cost-
efficiency and cost-effectiveness against policy objectives such as poverty 
reduction. DFID commissioned studies of ‘measuring and maximising value for 
money’ in social transfer programmes (White et al. 2013) and in social protection 
systems (White et al. 2015). As their titles indicate, this pair of manuals offers 
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guidance on how to assess whether social protection programmes and systems 
are actually reducing poverty and inequality, and how to achieve these goals 
more cost-efficiently and more cost-effectively. 
Cost-efficiency for social protection systems is about ensuring that 
planned outputs of the right quality are produced at the lowest 
possible cost… Cost-effectiveness is about achieving system 
outcomes and impacts at the lowest possible cost. The focus in low-
income countries is most often on cost-effectiveness in reducing 
extreme poverty and inequality… Ex ante analysis of cost-
effectiveness in terms of impacts on poverty is a standard feature in 
the appraisal section of business cases for social protection 
programmes.  
(White et al. 2015: x, 19) 
A third response by external actors was to point out that public spending 
decisions are political choices, not an inflexible technical rule, and that even the 
poorest countries can afford some spending on social protection. The World 
Social Protection Report 2017–19 reveals that spending on social protection as a 
percentage of GDP averages just 4.5 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, but 18 per 
cent in Western Europe (ILO 2017). It follows that African countries should 
allocate more to social protection, because poverty is lowest in countries that 
spend the most on social protection. Responding to complaints that resources 
simply are not available, the ILO produced guidelines showing governments how 
they can create more fiscal space for social protection. Options include: 
1. ‘Reallocating public expenditures;  
2. Increasing tax revenues;  
3. Expanding social security coverage and contributory revenues;  
4. Lobbying for aid and transfers;  
5. Eliminating illicit financial flows;  
6. Using fiscal and foreign exchange reserves;  
7. Borrowing or restructuring existing debt, and;  
8. Adopting a more accommodative macroeconomic framework’ (Ortiz et al. 
2015: ii). 
ILO’s research draws on empirical data and country case study experiences, but 
once again it was undertaken explicitly for advocacy purposes, to persuade 
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governments that they can (and should) spend more on social protection than 
they do already. 
Despite all these efforts, the question of who finances social protection 
programmes remains a contested issue between international organisations and 
many African governments. As Seekings (2017: ii) explains: 
International organizations have generally failed to convince national 
policy-making elites to raise and to allocate scarce domestic 
resources to social protection programmes. The result is an 
‘affordability gap’ between what is advocated for African countries 
and what these countries’ governments are willing to spend. 
4.3 Strengthening capacities to deliver social 
protection 
International agencies have invested heavily in building the capacity of 
governments in Africa to design and implement social protection programmes, 
and to strengthen social protection systems in their countries. This investment 
has taken several forms, including embedding expatriate consultants as advisors 
within relevant government ministries and agencies, arranging study tours for 
politicians and technical staff to observe and learn from social protection 
practices in other countries, and facilitating events such as high-level dialogues 
with parliamentarians or regional bodies such as the African Union. 
But the most popular capacity-building mechanism has been training workshops, 
where government officials from a single country or region, or across the world, 
come together for a period between one day and two weeks, to learn about 
social protection theory and practice from designated experts. The workshop 
setting also allows agencies delivering the training to imprint their preferred 
approaches to social protection on participants, through the positions taken by 
trainers in relation to controversial aspects, such as conditionalities and 
targeting. For instance, while the World Bank favours conditional cash transfers 
and poverty targeting using proxy means tests (to identify the poor), the ILO and 
UNICEF prefer unconditional cash transfers and categorical targeting (e.g. 
children and older persons). These preferences reflect fundamentally different 
visions of social protection. 
Two leading social protection agencies run their own training workshops: the ILO 
and the World Bank. The World Bank has run an annual training course in 
Washington since the early 2000s, now called the Social Safety Nets and 
Delivery Core Course, which attracts policymakers, analysts and operational 
staff from international agencies (including the World Bank itself) and NGOs. 
This course ‘aims to provide participants with an in-depth understanding of the 
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conceptual and practical issues on safety nets or social assistance as part of 
broader social protection systems’.10 One session in the 2019 course was called 
‘Making the case for social safety nets’, confirming that the pedagogical objective 
is ‘policy pollination’ as much as being purely educational. 
The ILO runs an Academy on Social Security every year at its International 
Training Centre in Turin. This two-week course offers ‘a diversified training 
package on governance and financing, reforms and extension of social 
protection systems’.11 Responding to Covid-19, several modules are now 
available online, including E-Coaching on Social Protection: Towards 
Responsive Systems and E-Learning on Impact Assessment for Social 
Protection Analysts.12 
Online training is also available through TRANSFORM, an inter-agency initiative 
led by ILO, UNICEF and UNDP and hosted by the ‘Virtual Campus’ of 
socialprotection.org. TRANSFORM – Leadership & Transformation Curriculum 
on Building and Managing Social Protection Floors in Africa – explicitly promotes 
the ILO’s preferred approach: ‘By the end of this course, you should be able to 
understand why and how a Social Protection Floor is beneficial to your specific 
country context and how it can assist social and economic development’.13 
From 2007–19 the EPRI, in collaboration with the Centre for Social Protection 
(CSP) at IDS and Maastricht University, ran a two-week advertised course twice 
each year, in South Africa and Thailand, called Designing and Implementing 
Social Protection Systems. ‘The course provides participants with an in-depth 
understanding of the conceptual and practical issues involved in effectively 
designing and implementing social protection systems’.14 More than 1,000 
participants from 72 countries completed this course. In 2020, EPRI launched an 
online version, Designing and Implementing Adaptive Social Protection Systems, 
to equip ‘policymakers, government officials, non-governmental organisations 
and practitioners in navigating Covid-19 with a resilience-building response’.15 
The CSP at IDS has been involved in capacity strengthening of policymakers 
and practitioners in governments and international agencies since its inception in 
2005. The CSP has designed and delivered 2–5-day in-country training 
workshops to more than 300 officials from the governments of nine African 
countries (Botswana, Chad, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Zambia, and Zanzibar). Some of these workshops included members 
of civil society and some were complemented by ‘training of trainers’ courses. 
 
10  World Bank social protection courses 2019. 
11  ILO Academy on Social Security. 
12  International Training Centre social protection courses. 
13  TRANSFORM, socialprotection.org. 
14  EPRI courses. 
15  ibid. 
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Most of these activities were sponsored by UNICEF as part of their technical 
support to social protection in each country. 
Since social protection is still a relatively new and constantly evolving policy 
agenda, international development agencies also invested in building the 
knowledge base of their own staff. The CSP has designed 18 training courses 
and delivered these to over 500 staff of multilateral agencies (FAO, European 
Commission, UNICEF, World Food Programme (WFP)) and bilateral agencies 
(DFID, Irish Aid, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)). Some 
of these courses were held at the agency headquarters, some were at IDS, and 
some were hosted by regional or country offices in Africa. In 2020, the CSP 
launched a free online course called Social Protection: A Primer with support 
from Irish Aid.16 
Although training courses convey specific information (e.g. the difference 
between ‘social risk management’ and ‘transformative social protection’) and 
technical skills (such as how to calculate targeting errors), they also offer an 
unparalleled opportunity for policy pollination, by giving trainers – who are 
invariably employed or contracted by international agencies – a platform and a 
captive audience of social protection policymakers and stakeholders. Social 
protection is replete with design dilemmas (cash or food? conditional or 
unconditional? targeted or universal?) that are not technical problems but policy 
choices that reflect competing ideological positions. Whether consciously or 
unconsciously, trainers communicate their personal biases – and those of their 
agencies – to course participants, and this inevitably infuses policy processes 
when participants return home to their jobs. 
4.4 Instigating national social protection policies 
or strategies 
At the turn of this century not a single African country had either a National 
Social Protection Policy (NSPP) or a National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS). 
To this author’s knowledge, Mali launched Africa’s first NSPP in 2002, followed 
by Cape Verde in 2005, Senegal in 2006, Malawi in 2008, and Sierra Leone in 
2009. So, by 2010, only five out of 55 African countries had adopted a NSPP or 
NSPS, four of these in West Africa. Social protection as a government policy had 
not yet taken root in any other region, and the momentum seemed to be stalling. 
One observer feared that social protection might be about to collapse and 
become just another development policy ‘bubble’ that disappeared within a few 
years: ‘in the early 2010s there were already signs that the interest in social 
protection was waning’ (de Haan, 2014: 315). 
 
16  Social Protection: A Primer. Professional Development Course, IDS. 
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However, predictions of social protection’s rapid rise and imminent demise 
proved to be premature. In 2011 alone, five more countries published their NSPP 
or NSPS, doubling the total to 10. By 2019, the number had risen to 35, almost 
two-thirds of the countries in Africa (64 per cent), with 30 countries publishing 
their social protection policy or strategy in just nine years (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2 Cumulative National Social Protection 
Policies/Strategies in Africa, 2000–2019 
Source: Author’s own. 
By region, West Africa dominates (11 out of 15 countries = 73 per cent 
coverage), followed by Central Africa (6/9 = 67 per cent), then East Africa (10/14 
= 71 per cent) and Southern Africa (7/10 = 70 per cent), with North Africa lagging 
behind (just 1/7 = 14 per cent) (Table 4.1). 
Despite this evidence of the majority of governments across Africa promulgating 
social protection policies in the last decade, it does not necessarily follow that 
this was a nationally owned process of developing and institutionalising a 
domestic policy agenda in every case. For one thing, the short period in which so 
many countries published these documents suggests that a policy transfer 
process was underway, meaning that policy development in one country is 
influenced by the development of similar policies in other countries. 
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Table 4.1 National Social Protection Policies or 
Strategies in Africa by region, 2019 
Region Countries with a NSPP/NSPS Countries with no 
NSPP/NSPS 
West Africa Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone 
Benin, Guinea,  
Guinea-Bissau, Togo 
Central 
Africa 
Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Gabon, 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea 
East Africa Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Tanzania (mainland + 
Zanzibar), Uganda 
Eritrea, Mauritius, Seychelles, 
South Sudan, Sudan 
Southern 
Africa 
Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Angola, Botswana,  
South Africa 
North Africa Mauritania Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Morocco, Western Sahara, 
Tunisia 
Note: This table follows the African Union regional classification. 
As was the case with the wave of PRSPs that spread across the global South in 
the early 2000s (as discussed earlier), the wave of new social protection policies 
in Africa between 2002 and 2019 reflects a heavy involvement of external actors 
who were guiding or driving this process. Most, if not all, of these policy 
documents were drafted or commissioned by international agencies and their 
expatriate consultants, with varying degrees of involvement of national 
consultants and relevant government officials. 
The weakly embedded nature of these donor-driven rather than nationally owned 
policy processes is revealed by the fact that West Africa, despite having the 
highest proportion of social protection policies, operates much fewer 
government-run social protection programmes at national scale than countries in 
East and Southern Africa, which have longer histories with delivering social 
assistance to their citizens, dating back even before the emergence of social 
protection as a development agency agenda in the early 2000s. South Africa 
introduced its first assistance programmes in the 1920s, Namibia in the 1940s 
and Botswana in the 1960s. All these programmes are still operating today, and 
many more have been introduced since, yet neither Botswana nor South Africa 
has a NSPP or NSPS and Namibia produced their draft Social Protection Policy 
 
ids.ac.uk IDS Working Paper Volume 2020 Number 543 
CSP Working Paper 018 
Policy Pollination: A Brief History of Social Protection’s Brief History in Africa 
40 
 
 
 
as recently as November 2018. One reason might be that all three are upper-
middle-income countries that already had the technical and financial capacity to 
design and implement these social programmes decades ago, without requiring 
advice or support from donor agencies and international financial institutions. 
By contrast, 22 of the 35 African countries that do have a NSPP or NSPS are 
low-income and 12 are lower-middle-income, with high levels of involvement of 
international development partners in domestic policy formulation. 
An interesting case of a low-income country with no NSPP despite a strong 
donor presence is Togo. From 2010–12, the World Bank led a process of 
developing a National Social Protection Policy and Strategy for Togo, which 
culminated in a World Bank report (the cover is reproduced below). The 
‘Acknowledgements’ explain that the World Bank presented their draft report at a 
workshop that was attended by relevant government ministries and ‘international 
partners active in social protection in Togo’. The final report ‘incorporates the 
Government’s comments’ (World Bank 2012: i). However, ten years after this 
donor-driven process started, the Government of Togo has not yet promulgated 
either a National Social Protection Policy or a National Social Protection 
Strategy. 
Figure 4.3 Cover of World Bank report on a social 
protection policy for Togo 
 
‘Acknowledgements 
This report was prepared by a World Bank team with 
support from the Government of Togo… The report 
draws from a series of background reports prepared by 
the Government and with support of various donors, 
including the World Bank, UNICEF, ILO, and UNDP 
over the last three years on different aspect of social 
protection in Togo. An initial draft of the report was 
reviewed in a national workshop in Togo in March 2012 
presided by the Ministry of Work, Employment and 
Social Security, with attendance by the key ministries 
and agencies of the Government as well as 
international partners active in social protection in Togo. 
During that workshop, the ILO provided technical 
support to carry out an initial costing exercise. This final 
version incorporates the Government’s comments…’ 
(World Bank 2012: i) 
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The covers of two other national social protection policy documents, from The 
Gambia and Liberia, display multiple symbols: the coat of arms of the country, 
and the institutional logos of international agencies that supported the 
development of the policy. In the case of The Gambia, the logos of UNDP and 
UNICEF are placed alongside the coat of arms. Liberia’s NSPP&S features two 
rows of agency logos: the European Union, Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA), African Development Fund and World Bank above; UNICEF, 
World Food Programme and Concern Worldwide below (Figure 4.4). It is unclear 
what this signifies, but it does imply that these policies were co-produced and co-
owned by the national government and the international community, or even 
worse, that the policy positions contained in these documents reflect the ideas 
and objectives of the international agencies that pushed for – and paid for – their 
production. 
Figure 4.4 Covers of The Gambia and Liberia 
National Social Protection Policies 
  
Sources: Government of The Gambia (2015) and Government of Liberia (2013) 
4.5 Domestication of international law 
A complementary explanation for the adoption of social protection by so many 
African governments almost simultaneously is social construction, which asserts 
that globalisation has been associated with a growing consensus across the 
world about appropriate societal goals and the appropriate actors and means to 
achieve them (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 2007). An opposite case in point is 
the rise since the Second World War in recognition of individual human rights (as 
a societal goal), the establishment of the United Nations and the International 
Criminal Court (as actors) and the overthrow of repressive dictatorships and their 
replacement with democratic institutions like regular elections and a free press 
(as means). 
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Seen through a constructivist lens, the rapid diffusion of social protection 
throughout Africa could be interpreted as reflecting the voluntary incorporation of 
globally constructed human rights-based agendas into domestic policy 
processes by African governments which, after all, are active participants in the 
global policy forums (notably the United Nations General Assembly) where 
international standards are debated, resolutions are adopted and conventions 
are ratified. Support for this view might be found by analysing the application of 
international law in specific country contexts. 
Table 4.2 Ratification by African countries of 
international social protection law 
Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) [1948] 
The UDHR has become customary 
international law, so all countries are 
bound by its main principles. 
Social Security (Minimum Standards) 
Convention 102 [1952] 
Only seven countries in Africa have 
ratified Convention 102. 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
[1966] 
43 countries in Africa have ratified 
the ICESCR. 
Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) [1979] 
All African countries except two have 
ratified CEDAW. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) [1989] 
All African countries have ratified the 
CRC. 
Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD) [2006] 
39 countries in Africa have ratified 
the CRPD. 
Source: Devereux (2017) 
In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserted that ‘everyone, as 
a member of society, has the right to social security’ (United Nations 1948). In 
1952, the ILO’s Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 102 
established the basis of modern social protection systems with nine branches of 
social security,17 including family benefit, health care, unemployment, and old 
age. In 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
‘recognise[d] the right of everyone to social security’ (Mpedi and Nyenti 2015). 
Other international conventions affirm the right to social protection or social 
security for specific vulnerable groups, notably the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), the Convention on the 
 
17  Note that the ILO uses the terms ‘social protection’ and ‘social security’ interchangeably. ‘Social protection, or 
social security, is a human right and is defined as the set of policies and programmes designed to reduce and 
prevent poverty and vulnerability throughout the life cycle’ (ILO 2017: xxix; emphasis added). 
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Rights of the Child (1989), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (2006). Most African countries have ratified these three conventions 
(Table 4.2). More recently and most pertinently, in 2012 all member states of the 
International Labour Conference voted to adopt the Social Protection Floors 
Recommendation (R202), which advocates for a rights-based package that 
guarantees access to health care for all as well as income security for children, 
people of working age and older persons (ILO 2012). 
The United Nations appoints Special Rapporteurs who function effectively as 
policy pollinators, by drafting policy statements that clarify the commitments 
governments have made under international law and travelling to countries to 
verify that member states are fulfilling their obligations. In 2012, the United 
Nations Special Rapporteurs on the Right to Food and on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights co-authored a proposal for a Global Fund for Social Protection (de 
Schutter and Sepúlveda 2012). This document helpfully clarifies the content of 
the right to social protection in international law and the obligations of member 
states to ‘respect, protect, and fulfil the right to social protection’ (ibid.: 5) as 
comprehensively and expeditiously as possible, including by passing appropriate 
domestic laws. 
Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), States must devote their maximum available 
resources to the fulfilment of economic and social rights, including 
through the establishment of social protection systems. As recognised 
under the ICESCR, some dimensions of economic and social rights 
can only be achieved progressively over time. However, this cannot 
be invoked as a pretext for delaying action.  
(de Schutter and Sepúlveda 2012: 6) 
An implicit theory of change explains how the globally affirmed human right to 
social protection might ‘cascade’ down to the realisation of this right by 
individuals living in specific country contexts (Devereux 2017). First, the country 
signs or ratifies relevant instruments in global (e.g. Union Nations) or regional 
(e.g. African Union) forums. Next, the provisions of these global and regional 
instruments are codified in national position statements such as the Constitution 
or National Development Plan. Third, policies, programmes and projects are 
designed and implemented to give effect to these provisions. Fourth, legislation 
is passed that gives these social protection interventions the status of a 
justiciable right. Finally, local civil society organisations campaign to hold the 
government accountable to deliver on the right to social protection. 
In reality, this process plays out in very few countries. The road from ratification 
to implementation to enforcement is very long – in some cases, non-existent.  
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For one thing, most global Declarations, Conventions, Covenants and 
Recommendations are not legally binding. The United Nations Special 
Rapporteurs have no legal authority to enforce United Nations resolutions. No 
government has yet been prosecuted at the International Criminal Court for 
violating the right to social protection. At the national level, a right to social 
security is specified in about half of the constitutions in Africa (14 out of 30 
examined by Fombad (2011)). But in most cases, this right is not justiciable – it 
cannot be enforced. In South Africa, civil society has taken the government to 
court, to uphold or extend the right to social protection. For example, an alliance 
of local civil society organisations successfully lobbied Parliament and the High 
Court to extend the age of eligibility for the Child Support Grant from seven to 18 
years, on the basis that 18 years is the legal definition of a child in South Africa 
(Proudlock 2009). 
But South Africa is an exception to the rule, for reasons related to its unique 
history (Devereux 2011). In many other African countries, civil society activities 
are curtailed and strictly regulated, and they have no freedom to campaign for 
economic, social, and cultural rights. This illustrates the critical point: that 
national governments are accountable to their domestic constituencies and are 
responsive to local political imperatives, rather than to declarations signed in 
global forums. 
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5. Understanding resistance: why 
some governments say ‘no’ 
As seen above, evaluations of social protection programmes in Africa have found 
unambiguously positive impacts on a range of indicators of poverty and 
vulnerability. Surely governments should want to implement policies and 
programmes that improve the wellbeing of their poor and vulnerable citizens? 
But this theory of change – that policy choices are entirely evidence-based – is 
not necessarily aligned with political reality. Governments do have some interest 
in evidence of what works. But they are mostly interested in what they need to do 
to remain in power. From this perspective, building the evidence base is more 
important to donor agencies, who report on the effectiveness of their aid 
spending to external constituencies, not to African citizens who vote for local 
politicians. 
Political self-interest drives government policy processes, not only in Africa but 
everywhere, and this is the lens through which all decisions about national social 
protection policies should ultimately be analysed. Governments need to be 
convinced that introducing a new policy and committing resources to new or 
scaled-up programmes will help them to win votes – in other words, policymaking 
is driven by ‘what’s popular’ rather than ‘what works’. 
In this context, social protection is susceptible to both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
politicisation (Devereux and White 2010). In democratic regimes with 
accountable governments, delivering benefits to poor people makes 
governments popular and earns them votes – a positive outcome for poor people 
and their governments. Negative politicisation occurs if governments manipulate 
targeting and eligibility criteria to ensure that benefits are disbursed not on the 
basis of need, but to their own supporters as a reward for their loyalty, or to 
opposition supporters to induce them to switch their vote in future elections. 
There are numerous examples of both forms of politicisation throughout Africa. 
Lesotho’s social pension became a campaigning issue in the 2007 elections, 
when opposition parties promised to double the amount paid to pensioners and 
the ruling party was forced to respond by promising to raise the payment, which 
they duly did after winning the election (Croome et al. 2007). This is an example 
of ‘positive politicisation’ because it was a win-win, both for pensioners and for 
the government. On the ‘negative politicisation’ side, political parties represent 
their constituencies rather than the nation as a whole, and disbursing benefits is 
often used to reinforce or expand the ruling party’s political base. In Zambia, 
donors who argued for rolling out the SCT from poorest to less poor districts on 
technical criteria (based on poverty headcount rankings) faced pressure from 
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politicians who wanted the SCT to be launched in their district first (irrespective 
of its poverty rank) (Harland 2014). In South Africa, the Child Support Grant is 
known by many as ‘Mandela money’, because it was introduced by the ANC 
government during Nelson Mandela’s presidency, and some voters fear that if 
they vote for an opposition party they could lose their grants (Plagerson et al. 
2012). 
African governments are located at the intersection between external pressure 
from international development agencies to implement specific policies and 
programmes in certain ways – exerted through hard or soft conditions on 
development aid – and internal pressure from local civil society to ‘do the right 
thing’ for poor and vulnerable citizens (if such activism is tolerated by the state). 
The imperative driving their policy choices is not necessarily how to reduce 
poverty rapidly, but political survival. So perhaps social protection is spreading 
because politicians are acting out of enlightened self-interest. 
One strategy that governments deploy to balance these competing priorities is to 
use the donors to finance certain programmes favoured by international 
agencies – such as social cash transfers – and to commit government resources 
to interventions that are more popular domestically. Malawi is a case in point. For 
over ten years the donors pushed to scale-up social cash transfers, building on a 
positively evaluated pilot project in Mchinji District.18 But the government 
preferred to allocate funds to supporting farmers with fertiliser and seed 
subsidies, because this is regarded as a more productive investment in a 
politically influential constituency. In other words, the government saw higher 
economic returns and more votes in giving agricultural inputs to farmers than in 
giving cash transfers to older persons and vulnerable children. Moreover, the 
government does not believe in prioritising cash transfers, which it sees as 
wasting scarce resources on people who don’t need help (because their families 
and communities should support them) and who won’t use the money 
‘productively’ (because children and older persons are not working).19 Eventually 
the social cash transfer did scale-up to cover all districts in Malawi, but mainly 
through funding provided by development agencies. The World Bank, European 
Union, Germany, and Ireland now support the SCT programme in 27 districts, 
while the government finances the SCT in just one district out of 28 (Government 
of Malawi 2019). 
The Malawi case illuminates two important asymmetries between African 
governments and their development partners. One is political: donor agencies 
believe (and have invested resources to prove) that cash transfer programmes 
 
18  The Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot Scheme was initiated and funded by UNICEF. A rigorous impact evaluation 
was commissioned by USAID and UNICEF, led by a researcher from Boston University. ‘Evidence from Mchinji 
demonstrates that, in just one year, $14 per month is capable of transforming the lives of ultra-poor households in 
virtually all dimensions of social and economic development’ (Miller et al. 2011: 115). 
19  In the late 1990s, when social pensions for older Malawians was first proposed by DFID and the World Bank, a 
government official dismissed the idea, rhetorically asking this author: ‘Why water a dying plant?’ 
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uplift poor people, and that governments should therefore allocate their own 
resources to such spending. But governments do not necessarily regard 
marginalised groups among the poor as politically important constituencies. Their 
political interests lie elsewhere – in this case, with supporting farmers (who grow 
the country’s food – a national strategic priority – and vote) rather than children 
(who do not vote) or older persons (who form a smaller part of the electorate in 
African countries than in OECD countries). 
The second asymmetry is about the choice of instruments. For whatever reason, 
the international development community identified social cash transfers as their 
preferred instrument for addressing poverty and vulnerability in the global South 
in the early 2000s. This meant that they allocated funds and technical expertise 
towards advocating and implementing cash transfer programmes in countries 
where they operate – and withheld funds and technical expertise from policy 
instruments they do not support (such as food or fertiliser subsidies). But many 
African governments remain unconvinced by cash transfers, because of negative 
perceptions and pejorative attitudes alluded to earlier: they are too expensive for 
low-income countries with widespread poverty; they create dependency and 
underwrite laziness; poor people are irresponsible and will waste any money 
they are given on alcohol (men) or hairdressing (women) (Adato et al. 2016). 
Even if governments are persuaded by the evidence that cash transfers do have 
positive impacts, they are not necessarily convinced that cash transfers to 
children or older persons will generate higher returns (in terms of poverty 
reduction, food security and economic growth impacts) than fertiliser subsidies to 
farmers. 
So when some governments seem reluctant to join in the enthusiasm of 
development agencies for cash transfers this is not simply stubbornness or 
intransigence. It reflects careful political calculations as well as genuine 
disagreements (which, regrettably, are rarely openly debated between African 
governments and their development partners) about the optimal allocation of 
scarce public resources in low-income settings. 
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6. Conclusion 
A particular form of social protection – social cash transfers targeted to poor and 
vulnerable groups – has been adopted by the majority of countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa during the last 20 years, backed up by financial and technical support from 
international agencies, the strengthening of administrative and capacities to 
deliver cash transfer programmes, and the drafting of national social protection 
policies. Several plausible explanations for this policy diffusion process have 
been considered in this paper, which can be framed as complementary theories 
of change: 
‒ Theory of change #1: It is an evidence-driven policy process. Social 
protection has been proven – through rigorous evaluations of cash transfer 
schemes – to achieve significant positive impacts on poverty and 
vulnerability. This accumulation of evidence convinced African governments 
to implement, scale-up and ultimately pay for their national social protection 
programmes. 
‒ Theory of change #2: It is a political choice. Politicians support policies 
that are electorally popular and consolidate their power. Given this context, 
social protection is expanding throughout Africa because delivering cash 
transfers is amenable to both positive and negative politicisation. 
‒ Theory of change #3: Social protection is well established in international 
law, from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 to the Social 
Protection Floors Recommendation in 2012. The adoption by African 
governments of national social protection policies, programmes and laws 
simply reflects the domestication of their legal commitments under 
international law.20 
As noted earlier, in the policy transfer literature, four causal mechanisms are 
commonly discussed. In three of these – learning, competition, and emulation – 
policies are voluntarily chosen by adopting governments, while in the fourth 
pathway – coercion – policies are imposed on governments against their will by 
external actors, using their hard or soft power. This paper has focused on a 
pathway closely linked to coercion, that I call policy pollination. 
‒ Theory of change #4: Social protection has been ‘pollinated’ throughout 
Africa, especially in low-income countries, by international development 
agencies, using their financial leverage and technical expertise to incentivise 
policy adoption by aid-dependent governments. 
 
20  This framing builds on an earlier article that identified three drivers of social protection in Africa – evidence (‘what 
works’), politics (‘what’s popular’), and ideology (‘what’s right’) (Devereux and White 2010). 
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The extent to which this policy process was coercively imposed on reluctant 
African governments and the extent to which it was autonomously chosen by 
these governments, with support they solicited from their development partners, 
varies from country to country. What is clear is that powerful international 
development agencies invested heavily across Africa in building the evidence 
base that cash transfers have positive impacts, by commissioning rigorous 
impact evaluations of programmes they supported technically and financially. At 
the same time, these agencies also invested heavily in strengthening the 
capacity of African governments to deliver social cash transfers, and to develop 
policies, instruments and systems that institutionalised social protection in 
national policy structures. 
Devereux and Kapingidza (2020: 298) propose six indicators for assessing the 
extent to which a social protection policy process can be characterised as 
‘donor-driven’ rather than ‘nationally owned’: 
1. ‘Whether the policy process is conceived, designed and facilitated mainly by 
external actors through their advisors and consultants, or is truly led by 
government policymakers and officials; 
2. Whether consultation processes are tokenistic and dominated by elites, or 
wide-ranging and genuinely inclusive of grass-roots organisations and poor 
people (i.e. prospective beneficiaries); 
3. Whether external actors favour specific instruments (e.g. SCT) rather than 
other instruments that may be favoured by African governments (e.g. 
agricultural input subsidies); 
4. If a donor-supported pilot project becomes a flagship national programme, to 
the detriment of existing national programmes that do not receive donor 
support; 
5. Whether evaluations of social protection programmes are commissioned by 
external actors and conducted by international research institutes, or 
commissioned by the government and conducted by local researchers; 
6. The proportion of social protection spending that is financed by external 
actors, versus domestic resource mobilisation and government commitment 
to co-financing that is actually disbursed.’ 
No judgement is made in this paper as to whether a donor-driven process of 
policy pollination is ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Arguably, the diffusion of social protection 
throughout Africa, however achieved, should be seen as a ‘win-win-win’, since it 
simultaneously serves the needs of the international development community as 
well as national governments and, of course, the African poor.  
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On the other hand, questions remain about the sustainability of social protection 
in those countries where external actors appear more committed to social 
protection than national actors. The test will come if and when development 
agencies withdraw their financial support and technical assistance, leaving each 
government to decide whether it is politically beneficial and fiscally cost-effective 
to continue investing in this specific set of social policy instruments. 
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